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What Use Is the Judiciary in a Financial Crisis?
Remarks of Judge Richard D. Cudahy*
Many years ago, Spencer Waller, who is moderating this program,
helped us Seventh Circuit judges with a big MCI v. AT&T antitrust
case.1 That was one of the major instances of applying the antitrust
laws to "regulated industries." 2 In some respects, invoking antitrust in
the case of "regulated industries" replaces the former regulators with the
judiciary. In the case of AT&T, Judge Greene of the District Court for
the District of Columbia became for about ten years the administrator of
the government's antitrust decree and, as such, the "regulator" of
AT&T. 3 That's an interesting, "different" role for the judiciary.4
Now, I want to congratulate the Law School on reaching the 100-year
mark. I used to think that 100 years was an awfully long time, but after
I crossed the eighty-year mark myself, the century began to shrink a
little. However, the last twenty years are still the toughest. Crossing
* Senior Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; B.S., U.S. Military
Academy; J.D., Yale Law School. I appreciate the invaluable assistance of my law clerk, Alan
Devlin, in preparing these comments for publication.
1. MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
2. Regulated industries have a long history of antitrust scrutiny. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark
A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, passim (2009); Stuart
M. Chemtob, Special Counsel for Int'l Trade, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Speech Before Fifth
International Symposium on Competition Policy and Law: The Role of Competition Agencies in
Regulated Sectors (May 11-12, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/225219.htm.
Network industries have also been the subject of an important recent decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398 (2004) (reducing the scope of antitrust enforcement in regulated industries).
3. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D. D.C. 1982).
4. What makes this observation all the more interesting is that the judiciary typically disavows
any direct role in regulating industry. See, e.g., Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. v. Nat'l Basketball
Assoc., 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996); Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under
the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 669
(1962).
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the century mark puts you in a very special class that gives you 100
years of experience, and that cannot be anything but a huge asset to the
education you provide. You have produced 100 years of graduates who
have distinguished themselves in every facet of the law, including the
judiciary. These are role models for all those who come after, and there
is no substitute for that. So heartiest congratulations and every good
wish for 100 years more.
In considering the role of the judiciary in the twenty-first century, an
interesting and timely aspect must be its function in dealing with the
financial crisis with which we are presently faced.5 Now, ordinarily,
one does not think of the judiciary or the courts as having any special
responsibilities in times of financial or economic turmoil beyond
performing such unpleasant tasks as ordering the foreclosure of
mortgages or receiving petitions in bankruptcy. 6  For the most part,
judges appear to have the job, to use a medical analogy, of declaring
patients dead after rigor mortis has set in. But the courts do not seem to
have visible involvement with curing the diseases that killed them. Yet,
even in this usual after-the-fact role, the function of judges may bear
more thought than is usually accorded it.
Of course, the courts are not institutions that one thinks of turning to
in times of financial crisis. Instead, one's thoughts turn to the Federal
Reserve, the Treasury Department, the Securities and Exchange
Commission and other like agencies that are charged in one way or
another with keeping the economic system healthy and vigorous. If one
thinks of the courts at all, it might be in terms of their place in the
regulatory system, which is considerable. 7  However, that system
operates more in terms of avoiding crashes than in dealing with their
fall-out after they have occurred. At the moment, we have what
5. For an interesting discussion of the causes and possible future implications of the 2008
financial crisis, see RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND
THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (Harv. Univ. Press 2009); see also Hon. Richard D. Cudahy,
The Coming Demise of Deregulation 11, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 543 (2009).
6. This is not to suggest that these seemingly prosaic roles are without any importance,
however. Indeed, Congress even seemed poised in early 2009 to amend bankruptcy law to allow
judges to adjust mortgage terms. Had this amendment passed, the judiciary would have had even
greater power to alleviate, or at least affect, the impact of the recession. See Elizabeth
Williamson & Ruth Simon, Plan to Cut Foreclosure Rate Clears Key Hurdle, WALL ST. J., Jan.
9, 2009, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123144562914865337.html; Greg
Hitt, House Centrists Prevail on Altering Mortgages in Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2009, at
A4, available at http://online.wsj.comarticle/SB123627573111742079.html; Janet Hook,
Mortgage Reduction Bill Fails in Senate, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at B1, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/maylOl /business/fi-cramdown ].
7. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1369-80 (1998).
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everyone agrees to be a severe recession following a major credit
crisis. 8 The stock market has crashed.9 The job market is hopeless. 10
Many people have lost their livelihood, their pension for retirement, or
their money in some other form. 11 The horses have escaped from the
barn. What can we do now to get control of them and drag them back
where they belong? What can be done to recover what has been lost?
In that connection, there is one thing we can be certain of: there will be
many law suits. There will be an almost universal feeling that so much
would not have been lost unless someone had done something wrong, or
the law had been broken in some way. Someone has failed to do his
duty. The ostensible purpose of the law suits will be to restore money
and property to their rightful owners, but in many cases it will be
evident from the beginning that the parties sued are not good for much
cash and that restitution is a vain hope.
What is really driving the situation and the pervasive impulse to have
recourse to the courts is a need to fix responsibility, to find out who
screwed up and make them pay-at least something.12 So we find that
the courts, which are responsible for restoring the status quo and
effecting restitution, are really fulfilling a symbolic function-assuring
the victims that they have identified the sources of their woes and made
the names of the miscreants into household words. A judicial
disposition relieves the victims of the intolerable feeling that somehow
an anonymous and impersonal system, through no fault of their own and
for no good reason that they can see, has relieved them of their financial
security and left them without even someone to blame. At least the
courts can give them someone to blame.
And not infrequently, for good reasons and for bad, the
overwhelming impulse to find a guilty perpetrator leads to criminal
prosecutions as an inevitable consequence of financial debacles. So far,
criminal prosecution has not played a leading role in countering the
present economic and financial distress, but I feel sure that demands for
8. See George Soros, The Worst Market Crisis in 60 years, F.COM, Jan. 22, 2008,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/24f73610-c9 le-I ldc-9807-000077b07658.html?nclickcheck=l.
9. See Where Have All Your Savings Gone, ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2008, at 13.
10. See Bad or Worse?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2008, at 41; Conor Dougherty, Soaring Job
Losses Drive Stimulus Deal, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2009, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.coml
article/SB 1233926276011 56735.html.
11. See Retirement Dreams Disappear with 401(k)s, CBSNEws.coM, Apr. 19, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/17/60minutes/main4951968.shtml.
12. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 113, 123 (1996); Nicole B. Casarez, Punitive Damages in Defamation Actions: An Area of
Libel Worth Reforming, 32 DuQ. L. REV. 667, 693 (1994) (observing that wronged private
plaintiffs typically sue for damages and retribution).
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prosecution will not be long in coming.13  Of course, at least one
criminal prosecution has already been brought-the Bernie Madoff
affairl 4-which was an old-fashioned Ponzi scheme and not really part
and parcel of the global credit crisis and attendant recession.15 That
Madoff should be prosecuted was about as undebatable as anything
could be and required no microscopic examination of accounting
methodology. But that financial disasters lead inevitably to criminal
prosecution (sometimes of questionable merit) has been demonstrated
time and time again in the history of the country. 16
A famous example is provided here in Chicago in the aftermath of
the 1929 crash. 17 In the 1920s, Samuel Insull was the most prominent
citizen of Chicago, with the possible exception of Al Capone. 18  He
virtually invented the electric utility business. 19 Later, in what proved
to be his undoing, he interested himself in acquiring electric utilities
around the country, bringing them together in what came to be called a
utility holding company. 20  Insull's holding company acquired a
reputation as a gilt-edged investment sold to widows and orphans, as
well as affluent citizens throughout the country. Since the holding
company was a pyramid, encumbered by debt at every level, it could
magnify the ever-increasing revenues from sales of electricity in
prosperous times but proved to be vulnerable when revenues declined,
as they did for the first time in history at the bottom of the Great
13. See Cary O'Reilly & Linda Sandler, Judges Punish Wall Street as Regulators Just Talk
About Reform, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 8, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5wZ95KdSuJQ.
14. See Diana B. Henriques, Madoff, Apologizing, is Given 150 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
2009, at Al.
15. See The Madoff Affair: Con of the Century, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 2008, at 28.
16. See Ashley Laurel Wilson, Lawsuit Increase Forecasted Due to Economic Recession,
CIO.COM, Nov. 17, 2008, http://www.cio.comarticle/463817/
LawsuitIncreaseForecasted Due to EconomicRecession_; Etain Lavelle, Financial Turmoil
May Lead to Wave of Lawsuits, THE DAILY MAIL (London), Mar. 25, 2009, available at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/money/article- 1164585/Financial-turmoil-lead-wave-lawsuits.html.
17. For a discussion of the 1929 crash, see MAURY KLEIN, RAINBOW'S END: THE CRASH OF
1929 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
18. For a more in-depth exploration of Insull's history by the author, see Hon. Richard D.
Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation After the
Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35 (2005); see also JOHN F. WASIK, THE
MERCHANT OF POWER: SAM INSULL, THOMAS EDISON, AND THE CREATION OF THE MODERN
METROPOLIS (2006).
19. See Jim Rossi, Universal Service in Competitive Retail Electric Power Markets: Whither
the Duty to Serve?, 21 ENERGY L.J. 27, 30-31 (2000).
20. See Alan Richardson & John Kelly, The Relevance and Importance of Public Power in the
United States, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 54, 55 (2005).
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Depression in the early 1930s. 21 Then, refusal of the New York bankers
to renew Insull's credit when he was desperate for cash sent his holding
company into receivership, and 600,000 stockholders were wiped out.22
Needless to say, the public outrage at Mr. Insull was broad and intense
and far more focused than even the present anger at AIG. The public
widely viewed him as dishonest and incompetent.
Insull decided not to stick around and persuade the public of its error,
and he fled to Greece, a nation with which the United States did not
then have an extradition treaty.23 (I once met the lawyer who got the
credit for advising Insull about Greece). From Greece, Insull traded
pleas of innocence with threats of prosecution with the United States
government for more than a year and then shipped out on a vessel
bound for Istanbul.24 The Turkish government proved more amenable
to U.S. persuasion than the Greek government, and eventually Insull
found himself aboard an American ship bound for New York.25 From
there he pressed on back home to Chicago, where he had been indicted
for mail fraud based on the allegation that the accounting reports of his
company were fraudulent and deceptive. 26  Numerous accountants
testified against him for days and weeks on end and he eventually took
the stand in his own defense. He told the story of his life: born a poor
boy in London, then secretary to the great inventor, Thomas Edison, and
an executive of Edison's enterprises. In fact, he eventually made his
way up the business ladder in the United States too. The jury was out
for only two hours and came in with a verdict of "not guilty." 27
So far, the present crisis in this country has not led to a rash of
criminal prosecutions patterned on Insull's case, but mounting public
indignation directed at the banks and other financial institutions and
intense prosecutorial interest on the part of such offices as the New
York Attorney General and the Department of Justice suggests that the
impoverished victims of this crash will be no less avid for vengeance
than those who have gone before. 28 Whether the criminal prosecutions
21. See Nidhi Thakar, The Urge to Merge: A Look at the Repeal of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 903, 908-09 (2008).
22. See id.
23. See Markian M.W. Melnyk & William S. Lamb, PUHCA's Gone: What Is Next for
Holding Companies?, 27 ENERGY L.J. 1,4 (2006).
24. See United States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. 111. 1934).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See ROBERT GRANT & JOSEPH KATZ, THE GREAT TRIALS OF THE TWENTIES: THE
WATERSHED DECADE IN AMERICA'S COURTROOMS 243 (Sarpedon 1998); David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Icarus and American Corporate Regulation, 61 BUS. LAW. 155, 156 (2005).
28. See David W. Ogden, Remarks of Deputy Attorney General at the Compliance Week
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to come will be more meritorious or successful than the charges against
Insull remains to be seen. But the judges and juries will have their work
cut out for them.
Less than ten years ago, we were treated to a rash of criminal
prosecutions arising from spectacular business failures. 29 These were
collapses pretty much restricted to their own circumstances and not
reflecting a malaise affecting the whole economy. But public
indignation at the financial damage and the prominence of the alleged
wrongdoers are very much the same as today. A quartet of failed or
severely troubled companies, whose executives were targeted, comes to
mind: Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and Global Crossing. 30 Enron is, of
course, the most renowned. 31  Fiercely touted in a booming stock
market, its shares soared above the $100 mark only to collapse into
worthlessness in little more than a year. Enron, which was a strident
advocate of deregulating the energy markets, gained a glowing
reputation for innovation and progressive thinking. 32  Through its
chairman, Kenneth Lay, it dabbled in politics and gained immense
prestige as a political power.33  But the end came in 2000 and 2001
when its accounting had to be repeatedly revised and its stock price
collapsed. 34 Bankruptcy and criminal prosecution for the executives
followed in short order. Lay and Jeff Skilling, president and chief
Keynote Address (June 4, 2009), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2009/dag-speech-
090604.html ("The appropriate role of the Department of Justice in responding to this crisis is
clear: We will be relentless in our investigation of corporate wrongdoing, and will not hesitate to
bring charges, where appropriate, for criminal misconduct on the part of businesses and business
executives."); Zachary A. Goldfarb, Bank of America Pays $33 Million to Settle Merrill Bonus
Charges, WASH. POST., Aug. 4, 2009, at Al1l; James Quinn, US Inquiry into CDS Market Begins,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), July 15, 2009; see also The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) ("An act to improve enforcement of mortgage
fraud, securities and commodities fraud, financial institution fraud, and other frauds related to
Federal assistance and relief programs, for the recovery of funds lost to these frauds, and for other
purposes.").
29. See Edward B. Diskant, Note, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the
Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126,
170-71 (2008); Pamela H. Bucy, Trends in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 44 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1287 (2007).
30. See Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate
Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1435 (2007).
31. See CHRISTOPHER L. CULP & WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, CORPORATE AFTERSHOCK: THE
PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR CORPORATIONS
(2003).
32. See LOREN FOX, ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL 77-97 (2003).
33. See Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 1495, 1505 n.52 (2005); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder
Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1279-80 (2002).
34. See Fox, supra note 32, at 6.
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operating officer, were indicted and tried on securities and wire fraud
charges. 35 Lay died before sentencing, but Skilling was sentenced to
twenty-four years. 36  Andrew Fastow, financial vice president and
designer of the balance-sheet schemes, also faced ten years.37
Considering losses to investors and to employees, who lost their jobs,
pensions, and much of their savings, there was a groundswell of outrage
to be satisfied.38
The story at WorldCom, a telecommunications company, was very
much the same.39 Here there had been some quite exotic accounting,
including the recording of operating expenses as capital items. The
CEO was Bernie Ebbers, a likable chap, who ended up serving twenty-
five years. 40 Again the losses involved were staggering and public taste
for blood was palpable.
Tyco did not go into bankruptcy but its CEO, Dennis Koslowski,
faced a twenty-five-year sentence. 41 Other executives went to prison as
well. Loans and unauthorized compensation to executives were at the
heart of the problem. Here, publicity evoked much public indignation.
At Global Crossing, another telecommunications company, no one went
to prison, but Gary Winnick, the chairman, had to pay $55 million to
settle a class action suit. 42
Furthermore, criminal charges were brought against Richard Scrushy,
the CEO of a healthcare firm in Alabama. 43 First, he was acquitted on
accounting fraud charges 44 (after joining a Birmingham church, and
35. See Kristen Crawford, Lay Surrenders to Authorities, CNNMONEY.COM, July 12, 2004,
http://money.cnn.com/2004/O7/08/news/newsmakers/lay; Skilling Indicted for Fraud,
CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 19, 2004, http://money.cnn.com/20O4/02/19/news/companies/skiIling/
index.htm.
36. See Kurt Eichenwald, Enron Founder, Awaiting Prison, Dies In Colorado, N.Y. TIMES,
July 6, 2006, at AI; Former Enron CEO Skilling Gets 24 Years, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 23, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15389150/. On October 13, 2009, the Supreme Court agreed to
hear Skilling's case. See Skilling v. United States, 2009 WL 1321026 (U.S.) (2009).
37. See Kate Murphy & Alexei Barrionuevo, Fastow Sentenced to 6 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 2006, at CI.
38. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Fall Apart, 57 BuFF. L. REV. 959, 1017-18 (2009).
39. See DENNIS R. BERESFORD ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM, INC. (2003),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723527/000093176303001862/dex991 .htm.
40. See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110 (2d. Cit. 2006).
41. See Grace Wong, Kozlowski Gets Up to 25 Years, CNNMONEY.COM, Sept. 19, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/09/19/news/newsmakers/kozlowskisentence/index.htm.
42. See Almar Latour & Dennis K. Berman, Global Crossing SEC Deal Expected, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 22, 2004, at A8.
43. See Simon Romero, The Rise and Fall of Richard Scrushy, Entrepreneur, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21,2003, at C4.
44. See Greg Farrell, Scrushy Acquitted of All 36 Charges-Ex-HealthSouth CEO Had Been
20101
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contributing a million dollars to it, thereby allegedly tainting the jury
poo145), and then convicted on bribery charges and sentenced to eighty-
two months. 46 Thus, bankruptcy is frequently followed by corporate
fraud charges, and it is an old story how this can be triggered by public
indignation driven by widespread financial losses. So there is reason to
believe that criminal prosecutions may be in the offing as a product of
current financial problems, even though the problems may appear to be
more the fruit of a stormy financial climate rather than the result of the
misdeeds of an identifiable human being punishable under the criminal
law.47 The task of distinguishing between crime, of which there may in
fact be quite a lot, and inept navigation through dangerous financial
shoals that results in painful loss, will challenge the judiciary.
Of course, as I mentioned earlier, the judiciary also plays a role in the
regulatory process. This is often, but not necessarily, initiated in the
administrative agencies. There has been much talk about the need for
more and better regulation to avoid the pitfalls that have apparently led
to the current collapse. 48 I say "apparently" because no one seems to be
entirely sure of the steps and missteps leading to the present crisis.49
However, it seems to be reasonably clear that it all began with sub-
prime mortgages-that is, mortgages applying less than rigorous
standards and more likely than average to default-and spread from
there to packages of mortgage-backed securities of unknown quality
offering unknown risks as they made their way through the channels of
securitization. 50 These processes were complicated by the massive use
of credit derivatives, which were developed only recently and lacked
accountability. 51 Merely requiring these credit derivatives to be traded
on exchanges, and thereby to be accounted for, would be a substantial
Accused in $2.7 Billion Fraud, USA TODAY, June 29, 2005, at IA.
45. See Simon Romero, Will the Real Richard Scrushy Please Step Forward; Race, Religion
and the HealthSouth Founder's Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2005, at Cl.
46. See Fact Sheet: Department of Justice Public Corruption Efforts, U.S. FED. NEWS, Mar.
27, 2008, 2008 WLNR 5916347.
47. See Andrew J. Ceresney, Gordon Eng, & Sean R. Nuttall, Regulatory Investigations and
the Credit Crisis: The Search for Villains, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 225 (2009).
48. See, e.g., Tyler Cowen, Too Few Regulations? No, Just Ineffective Ones, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2008, at BU7.
49. For some representative views, see POSNER, supra note 5; GEORGE SOROS, THE CRASH
OF 2008 AND WHAT IT MEANS: THE NEW PARADIGM FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS (2009); PAUL
KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 (2009); JOHN B.
TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED,
PROLONGED AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009).
50. See The Economy: A Thoroughly Modern Recession, ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2008, at 83;
America's Housing Market: Cracks in the Facade, ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 2007, at 60.
51. See Capitalism at Bay, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2008, at 16.
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regulatory move. Obviously, the technical details of regulation would
have to be applied by the agencies, but the system would be undergirded
by the courts and the judges, who would have the last word in the
regulatory process.
In large part as a result of this financial debacle, which seems so
inexplicable to everyone, we are undergoing a revolution in thinking
about regulation. 52  Starting in the Forties and ongoing until very
recently, legal thinking has been increasingly antagonistic to regulation.
Deregulation has been favored wherever it could possibly be justified.53
This has been the case in the so-called "regulated industries"-
transportation, telecommunications, electric power, and so on.54 It has
also been the case in the financial industries where it played a role in the
savings and loan crisis in the Eighties as well as now in the present
credit crisis.55 Deregulation and reliance on the market as the arbiter of
all issues has been the conventional wisdom for a long time. This kind
of thinking is still playing a decisive role today in preventing the
nationalization of the banks. 56 But the present debacle is showing the
deficiencies of this kind of thinking and the dangers of excessive
reliance on markets in maintaining economic equilibrium. Thinking
now will turn decisively to regulation for an indefinite period57 -
perhaps excessively, in reaction to the long swing away from it 58-but
there will certainly be a turn now, and it will be up to the judges, as the
ultimate enforcers of the administrative state, to support the turn and at
the same time prevent it from going astray.
In conclusion, I think the judiciary has important roles to play as we
seek to climb out of the financial pit. First, it must preside at the
various trials after the collapse-civil and criminal-that seek to put
Humpty Dumpty together again and to inflict just retribution on those
responsible. But the watchword here is justice, not merely revenge for
its own sake. Second, the judiciary must provide firm support for the
52. See Government v. Market in America: The Visible Hand, ECONOMIST, May 30, 2009, at
34.
53. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7.
54. See id.
55. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 243-45 (2008); David
Leonhardt, Washington's Invisible Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at 32 (Magazine).
56. Cf Steve Lohr, U.S. Not Always Averse to Nationalization, Despites Its Free-Market
Image, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/business/
worldbusiness/i 3iht-nationalize.4.16915416.html.
57. See Cudahy, supra note 5; Wall Street's New Shape: Rearranging the Towers of Gold,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 2009, at 10.
58. See America's Long-Run Growth Potential, ECONOMIST, May 16, 2009, at 39 (opining
that "more regulation, in finance and beyond, could deter innovation").
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regulatory regime which will be coming into force to stabilize the
economy.
